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MANDATORY DRUG TESTING FOR FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES AND PRIVATE EMPLOYEES IN
GOVERNMENT REGULATED INDUSTRIES: IS DRUG
TESTING WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
On September 15, 1986, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order
12564, instructing the director of each executive agency to implement a drug

testing plan (plan) for federal agency employees.' The most controversial
aspect of the plan authorizes testing of certain classes of employees without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the employees have

1. See Exec. Order No. 12564, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986). The purpose of President
Reagan's Executive Order 12564 (Order) authorizing drug testing for federal employees is to
identify and to rehabilitate federal employees who use drugs and thus to create a drug-free
federal workplace. Id; President's Message to Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, 22
WErEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1194 (Sept. 15, 1986). Each agency director, in addition to
implementing testing procedures for federal employees, must provide educational services
regarding drug abuse, training of supervisory personnel for detection of illegal drug use among
federal employees, and referral services for rehabilitation of identified drug users. Exec. Order
No. 12564, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,890 (1986). The Order forbids the testing of federal employees to
procure evidence for use in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 32,892.
The Order permits disciplinary action against identified drug users, but agency directors
may not discharge from government service an identified drug user unless the employee refuses
to participate in a drug rehabilitation program or continues to use illegal drugs. Id. at 32,891.
Executive Order No. 12564 is part of a comprehensive plan of the Reagan Administration
to curtail the incidence of drug trafficking in the United States. Reagan: Drugs Are the 'No.
I' Problem, NEWSvEEK, August 11, 1986, at 18. In March 1986, the President's Commission
on Organized Crime (Commission) recommended that private employers and the federal
government initiate drug testing programs for employees to discourage drug use in the United
States. Battling the Enemy Within, TmE, March 17, 1986, at 52. Acting on the Commission's
recommendation, President Reagan submitted proposed legislation to Congress to deter drug
trafficking and included a provision to permit drug testing of federal employees. See CoNr.
Q., Sept. 20, 1986, at 2192 (discussing legislative proposals). After heated debate in the
Congress, Congress deleted from the proposed legislation the provision for testing of federal
employees. CONG. Q., Oct. 25, 1986, at 2699. The Executive Order, however, is binding on
executive agencies. CONG. Q. Sept. 20, 1986, at 2192.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
provides in part for the right of persons "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . ." and that government agents not
execute a search unless they first obtain a warrant supported by probable cause. Id.
To establish probable cause, the person seeking a search warrant must produce substantial
evidence that the item sought is related to criminal activity and will be found in the area to
be searched. W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIIHNAL PROCEDURE, § 3.3, at 110 (West 1985).
3. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, (1968). The reasonable suspicion standard,
first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, permits a police officer to conduct
a limited search of a person for weapons if a police officer observes conduct that, in light of
experience, leads the officer to suspect that the person is involved in criminal activity and is
armed and dangerous. Id.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, other courts have established the
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engaged in the use of illicit drugs. 4 Critics of the testing plan argue that
the plan constitutes an unreasonably intrusive invasion of the employees'
right to privacy.- Proponents of the President's plan, however, not only
have endorsed drug testing for federal employees, but have advocated drug
testing for private employees who undertake employment in federallyregulated industries. 6 Despite the worthy objective of the plan to create a
drug-free federal work place, however, emerging case law indicates that the
proposals to implement drug testing plans for both groups of employees
constitutes a search under the fourth amendment and, therefore, must
comport to the reasonableness standard that the fourth amendment de7
mands.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides for
the protection of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against
arbitrary or random government intrusion.' In interpreting the scope of the

reasonable suspicion standard as the appropriate standard to govern other types of searches
as well. See, e.g., Security & Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 205 (2d
Cir. 1984)(reasonable suspicion is required to conduct strip searches of correctional officers);
infra note 44 and accompanying text (reasonable suspicion is required to conduct drug testing
of public employees).
4. See Exec. Order No. 12564, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,890 (1986). The Executive Order
authorizing drug testing for federal employees defines "sensitive" positions as those positions
that an agency director determines involve law enforcement, national security, the protection
of public property, public health or safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of trust
and confidence. Id. at 32,892. The Order also requires mandatory testing for all personnel
who have access to classified information or who serve under presidential appointment. Id.
Personnel who do not hold a sensitive position may be tested only upon reasonable suspicion
to believe that an employee uses illegal drugs. Id. at 32,890.
5. See U.S. NEws & WoaRn REPoRT, March 17, 1986, at 58 (subjecting all federal
employees to random drug testing violates fundamental principle of fairness); L.A. Daily J.,
Sept. 23, 1986, at 4, col. 1 (drug testing without cause establishes dangerous precedent and is
repugnant to United States Constitution); L.A. Daily J., Sept. 18, 1986, at 4, col. 1 (random
drug testing of federal employees would result in unprecedented invasion of civil liberties of
government workers); Meyer, FederalDrug Testing and ConstitutionalRights, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Sept. 17, 1986, at 14, col. 1 (testing of employees without probable cause is violative
of fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable search and seizure); N.Y. Times, May
3, 1986, at Al, A32, col. 3 (statements of union representatives of federal employees that
drug testing violates fourth amendment).
6. See Congressional Study Finds Drug Tests of U.S. Employees Are "Costly and
Useless, " ComsticToNs Dio., July 2, 1986, at 7, col. 1 (statement by spokesman for U.S.
Senator Paula Hawkins, (R-Fla.), advocating drug testing for federal employees); see also
U.S.A. Today, Feb. 3, 1987, at 8A, col. I (advocating random drug testing of train operators,
air traffic controllers, and commercial airline pilots); L.A. Daily J., July 22, 1986, at 4, col.
3 (advocating drug testing to reduce drug use by public employees). Workers Drug Test
ProvokingDebate, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1986, at Al, A32, col. 3 (citing statement by attorneys
for federal agencies explaining that fourth amendment does not prohibit drug testing for public
safety employees, particularly air traffic controllers).
7. See infra notes 23-43 and accompanying text (urinalysis drug testing for municipal
fire fighters constitutes fourth amendment search); notes 45-51 and accompanying text (urinalysis drug testing for municipal police officers constitutes fourth amendment search).
8. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In Katz v. United States the
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fourth amendment's protection, courts have indicated that an individual's

interest in preserving personal integrity against arbitrary government intrusion is one of the most fundamental interests to which the fourth amendment
extends protection. 9 Bodily intrusions and searches of individuals implicate

fundamental notions of personal privacy and human dignity. Because searches
of the individual are among the most severe intrusions on an individual's
privacy interest, courts generally have sanctioned such intrusions only in

closely circumscribed situations.' 0
The government's plans to implement drug testing for federal employees

and private employees engaged in federally-regulated industries implicates
the protection of the fourth amendment because individuals maintain a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of bodily fluids.', In
Schmerber v. United States,'2 for example, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that the extraction of a blood sample for the purpose of determining the defendant's blood alcohol content constituted a search within

the purview of the fourth amendment.

3

In Schmerber, a police officer

investigating an automobile accident arrested the driver of the automobile

at a hospital while the driver received treatment for injuries he had sustained
in the accident.

4

The officer had observed both the accident scene and the

United States Supreme Court explained that the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution extended protection against arbitrary intrusion not only to certain physical areas,
such as one's home or office, but also to that which a person seeks to preserve as private.
Id. Personal property or conversations that a person knowingly exposes to the public, for
example, do not enjoy protection of the fourth amendment. Id.
Expounding upon the opinion of the majority in Katz, Justice Harlan proposed a twopart test for determining whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus
enjoys fourth amendment protection. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). To have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, an individual must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of privacy
regarding the object of the search, and the individual's expectation must be one that society
regards as reasonable. Id.
9. See Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)(integrity of individual's
person is cherished value of society); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949)(security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion is basic to free society); United States v. Afanador,
567 F.2d 1325, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978)(human body enjoys fullest protection of fourth amendment); see also L. TmBE, AMEiPCAN CoNsrmoiNAo.

LAW,

§

15-9, at 913 (1978)(right of

privacy fully embraces interest in privacy of human body).
10. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979)(visual body cavity searches are
inherently offensive and permissible only when absolutely necessary); United States v. Afanador,
567 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir. 1978)(greater physical intrusion requires greater degree of
justification for search); infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (extraction of blood sample
for alcohol content determination is permissible only upon clear indication of intoxication).
11. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (D.N.J. 1986)(urinalysis can
constitute infringement on reasonable expectation of privacy), aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)(same); infra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that drawing of blood
sample infringes on reasonable expectation of privacy); infra note 24 and accompanying text
(fire fighters maintain legitimate expectation of privacy in discharge of urine).
12. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
13. Id. at 767.
14. Id. at 768-69.
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condition of the defendant at the hospital shortly after the time of the
accident and had probable cause to believe that the driver was intoxicated.
The officer, without procuring a warrant, directed an attending physician
to extract a blood sample from the defendant for determination of the
16
defendant's blood alcohol content.
Although the Court in Schmerber concluded that the officer had acted
reasonably in ordering the extraction of blood from the defendant, the
Court indicated that extraction of fluids from beneath the body's surface
implicated fundamental interests in human dignity and privacy protected by
the fourth amendment. 17 The Court recognized that exigent circumstances
precluded the feasibility of obtaining a warrant before ordering the extraction."' Moreover, the Court in Schmerber acknowledged that the procedure
produced little discomfort and minimal risk of harm to the defendant.' 9
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the fourth amendment forbade a
forced blood extraction simply upon the likelihood that the sample would
reveal evidence of intoxication." The interest in preserving the integrity of
an individual's body against wanton intrusion justified the Court's holding
in Schmerber that only a clear indication that the blood sample would yield
21
evidence of intoxication justified the inherently intrusive search.
Federal courts that have considered the constitutionality of state and
municipal sponsored testing schemes that require public employees to submit

15.

Id. In Schmerber v. United States, the police officer who arrived at the scene of

the accident shortly after the accident occurred smelled liquor on the defendant's breath. Id.
at 769. The officer testified that the defendant's eyes appeared blood shot and watery, indicating
that the driver was intoxicated. Id.
16. Id. at 758.
17. Id. at 767.
18. Id. at 770. In Schmerber v. United States, the United States Supreme Court explained
that the fourth amendment ordinarily requires that a police officer secure a warrant from a
neutral and detached magistrate before executing a search. Id. The Court, however, explained
that, in this case, exigent circumstances justified the officer's ordering the extraction of blood
before obtaining a warrant. Id. at 770-71. Through observation of the defendant's condition,
the officer could have had probable cause to believe that the defendant was intoxicated. Id.
at 768-70. Moreover, if the officer had delayed blood extraction until he had obtained a
warrant, the officer risked destruction of the evidence, because blood alcohol content begins
to diminish shortly after a person stops ingesting alcohol. Id. at 770-71.
19. Id. at 771. The Supreme Court in Schmerber concluded that a blood test was a
reasonable means of determining the defendant's blood alcohol content. Id. Blood tests are a
routine medical practice and common procedure in most physical examinations. Id. Furthermore, the test occurred in an aseptic environment under the direction of a physician and
involved little risk of infection to the defendant. Id. at 771-72.
20.

Id -at 769-70. The Supreme Court in Schmerber v. United States rejected the

respondent's contention that the extraction of blood from the petitioner was a search incident
to a lawful arrest. Id. At common law, police could perform a limited search of a suspect for
weapons or evidence under his direct control before taking him into custody. Id. The Supreme
Court in Schmerber, however, stated that the right to search a suspect incident to a lawful
arrest did not permit an intrusion beneath the body surface simply to discover whether the
defendant was intoxicated. Id.
21. Id. at 770.
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to urinalysis have found that urinalysis, like blood testing, constitutes an
infringement on an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy.- In Capua
v. City of Plainfield, for example, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey determined that a mandatory drug testing program
requiring City of Plainfield fire fighters to submit to random urinalysis
constituted an infringement on the fire fighters' legitimate expectation of
privacy. 24 The district court found that the act of urination is a personal
and intimate act, and most individuals generally discharge urine without
intending to expose themselves or the contents of their urine to the public.?
Moreover, the district court in Capuanoted that urinalysis is a sophisticated
procedure that can reveal personal and medical information to which the
City did not need to have access.26 The district court in Capua therefore
concluded that compelling an individual to produce a urine specimen for
the purpose of urinalysis is a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
Although the district court in Capua stated that urinalysis was an
infringement of the fire fighters' reasonable expectation of privacy, the
court acknowledged that the fourth amendment would not prohibit the
search if the search was reasonable? As the Capua court noted, determining
the reasonableness of a search is not a mechanical process, but instead
involves a weighing of the state's need to execute the particular search
against the infringement on an individual's privacy that the search entails.-

22. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 879-80 (E.D. Tenn.
1986)(fire fighters maintain legitimate expectation of privacy in discharge and contents of
urine); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ga. 1985)(municipal employees);
Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(correction officers); Turner v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1986)(same); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)(muaicipal police officers); Caruso v.
Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, -,
506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)(same); see also
infra note 24 and accompanying text (public employees maintain legitimate expectation of
privacy in discharge and contents of urine).
23. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
24. Id. at 1513; see infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (explaining that individuals
maintain legitimate expectation of privacy in expelling urine).
25. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986); accord American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Lovvorn
v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 132425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, -, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789,
792 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
26. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 647 F. Supp. at 1513; see Note, Drug Testing in the
Workplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect Privacy, 13 J. LEGis. 269, 279 (1986). A urine
specimen, in addition to revealing the presence of drug particles in an individual's body, also
can yield information regarding one's medical history of venereal disease, epilepsy, schizophrenia and the subject's susceptibility to heart disease and sickle cell anemia. Note, supra, at
279.
27. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
28. Id.; accord New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)(explaining factors court
must consider in determining constitutionality of search); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640,
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In assessing the reasonableness of a search, a court must consider the extent

to which the intrusion infringes on an individual's personal privacy, the
government's justification for initiating the search, the place in which the29
search occurs and the manner in which the government conducts the search.

To constitute a reasonable search, the Capua court stated, the state's interest
in conducting the search must outweigh the infringement on individual rights
30
that the search causes.

The court in Capua recognized that the City of Plainfield had a weighty

interest in ensuring that drug use did not hamper the fire fighters' performance.3' Fire fighters and other safety officers must be able to perform their
duties adequately. 32 Drug use among the fire fighters would impair the fire
fighters' ability to function properly. The City of Plainfield, as the fire

fighters' employer, bore responsibility for ensuring that the fire fighters
were fully capable of protecting the general public from fires.3" Drug testing

identify those emof the employees, therefore, would enable the City 3to
4
ployees who were unfit for public service as firemen.

Against the legitimacy of the City's interest, the court in Capua weighed
the extent to which the urinalysis intruded upon an individual's right to
privacy and determined that the intrusion was extreme.3 5 The court deter-

mined that compelling an individual to urinate in the presence of a Fire
Department official who verified the authenticity of the sample was a
humiliating and embarrassing experience. 36 The lack of procedural safeguards

37
in administering the test jeopardized the confidentiality of test results.
Moreover, because the officials had administered the tests in a dragnet
fighter a presumption of
manner, the officials had placed against each fire
38

guilt and forced him to rebut the presumption.

644 (1983)(same); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)(same);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)(same); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)(same).
29. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986)(citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
30. Id.

31. Id. at 1516.
32. Id. at 1519.
33. Id. at 1516.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 1514; see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (explaining why drug
testing through urinalysis constitutes relatively high degree of bodily intrusion of fire fighters'
privacy interest).
36. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986). As the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey noted in Capua v. City of Plainfield, body
surveillance is essential and standard procedure during administration of a urine drug test. Id.
37. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1520. In Capua v. Plainfield, the Plainfield Fire Department
had not established regulations to ensure that the identities of fire fighters whose drug tests
indicated positive results would remain confidential. Id. Once they have incriminating evidence
of drug use, government entities may not be able to withhold that evidence from prosecuting
agents. Id. The court in Capua concluded that the testing plan subjected the fire fighters to
the risk of criminal prosecution, thus making the testing procedure more intrusive. Id.
38. Id. at 1516-17.
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In balancing the extent of the intrusion of an individual's right to privacy
that urinalysis represented against the City's interest in ensuring that the
City's fire fighters remained free from drug-induced impairment, the district
court in Capua found that the means by which the City attempted to achieve
the goal were unreasonable.3 9 The City had not justified the need for the
search by demonstrating that drug use within the Fire Department or among
individual fire fighters had undermined the preparedness of the Fire Department. 40 On the contrary, the Fire Department had a satisfactory service
record. 41 The testing procedure, however, constituted an extreme deprivation
of the fire fighters' privacy interest.4 2 The court in Capua, therefore,
concluded that the need for the testing did not outweigh the extent of the
intrusion and permanently enjoined the Fire Department from continuing
the urine testing program unless the Fire Department officials had at least
an individualized, reasonable suspicion to believe that a fire fighter was
43
under the influence of drugs.
The decision in Capua is consistent with the vast majority of federal
and state court decisions that have held that testing a public employee for
drugs without reasonable suspicion to believe that the employee is under
the influence of drugs violates the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 44 In Penny v. Kennedy,45 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee enjoined the
Commissioner of Fire and Police for the City of Chattanooga from conducting department-wide urinalysis of City police officers in the absence of
reasonable suspicion to believe that a police officer was under the influence
of narcotics." In Penny, the court acknowledged that the City of Chattanooga had a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the City police
from the debilitating effects of drugs.47 The Police Chief, however, had not
established a nexus between drug use among police officers and a threat to
the City's interest. 48 The Chief of Police stated that he believed ninety

39. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional infirmities
of drug testing plan).
40. Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1519.
41. Id.
42. Id.at 1518.
43. Id. at 1522.
44. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)(testing
of firemen is unconstitutional in absence of reasonable suspicion of drug use); Turner v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008-09 (D.C. 1986)(same); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So.2d 1322, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)(city must have reasonable suspicion
-, 506
of drug use to test city police officers); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544,
N.Y.S.2d 789, 799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)(same); infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text

(reasonable suspicion needed to subject city police officers to drug testing).
45. 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
46. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (explaining that testing of police
officers was unreasonable without reasonable suspicion).
47. Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
48. Id. at 816-17. In Penny v. Kennedy, the Chattanooga Chief of Police ordered all
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percent of the police officers in the Department did not have a drug
problem. 49 Moreover, the Chief of Police offered no conclusive evidence to
show that the remaining ten percent of the police officers who allegedly
used drugs had a drug problem and thereby weakened the integrity or
preparedness of the Police Department.5 0 The court, therefore, concluded

that the substantial intrusion in subjecting the Department to urinalysis was
unjustifiable in its inception and thus unconstitutional. 5'
In holding that local and federal government entities can test public
employees on the standard of reasonable suspicion of drug use, rather than
the more stringent probable cause standard, courts have conceded that the
government's interest in promoting public safety justifies some infringement
on a public employee's privacy interest.5 2 Public employees do not surrender

all constitutional rights simply because they undertake public employment.53
The balancing of the government's interest in public safety and a public
employee's privacy interest, however, demands that a public employee
surrender some degree of fourth amendment protection for the benefit of
the public. 54 The reasonable suspicion standard, courts conclude, accommodates the government's interest in promoting public safety and the
integrity of the government service by permitting government entities to
investigate potentially dangerous behavior on a lesser showing of cause than
55
needed to investigate the activity of a private citizen.

360 members of the Police Department to submit to urinalysis in March 1985. Id. at 816.
Two of the officers tested positive. Id. Based on unsupported rumors that some of the officers
had altered their urine samples, the Chief of Police ordered all members of the Police
Department to undergo another urinalysis. Id. The plaintiff then filed suit to enjoin the Police
Department from administering the second test. Id.
49. Id. at 816. Several weeks before trial, the Police Chief in Penny v. Kennedy stated
that he was uncertain whether drug use among police officers of the Chattanooga Police
Department threatened the ability of the officers to perform their duties. Id.
50. Id. at 816-17.
51.

Id. at 817.

52. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for selecting
reasonable suspicion as appropriate standard governing drug testing of public employees).
53. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491.(N.D. Ga. 1985); see also American
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736-37 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (Department of Defense civilian employees retain fourth amendment protection after assuming public
employment); Lovvorn v. City Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)(municipal
fire fighters); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, -, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 798 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986)(municipal police officers).
54. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); see also
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D. Ga.
1986)(public employee has expectation of privacy that is diminished in comparison to expectation of privacy of private citizens); Caruso v..Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, -,
506 N.Y.S.2d
789, 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)(police officers, by reason of nature of their duties, should
anticipate a diminished expectation of privacy in drug testing).
55. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D.
Ga. 1986); see also Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)(testing of
municipal police officers is unconstitutional unless supervisor has reasonble suspicion of drug
use); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)(testing of
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Despite the consensus among courts that the testing of public employees
without individualized suspicion violates the fourth amendment, President
Reagan's Executive Order 12564 (President's directive) authorizes drug testing of federal employees in positions of public safety without a showing of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the employees are
under the influence of drugs.5 6 The directive instructs the director of each
federal agency to determine whether employees in that particular agency
classify as "sensitive" employees. The directive potentially applies to one
million, one hundred thousand federal employees who have positions that
57
could be classified as "sensitive."
Supporters of mandatory drug testing have offered several arguments to
support their position. One supporter, for example, argues that mandatory
drug testing does not violate the fourth amendment if the testing is for the
purpose of promoting employee discipline. 5 According to this commentator,
a search must comport to fourth amendment standards only if the search
is incident to a criminal investigation. 59 The purpose of the President's
directive is to identify and rehabilitate, but not prosecute, federal workers
who are drug users.6 Therefore, drug testing of public employees, the
proponent argue, need not comply with the fourth amendment's demand
that a search be reasonable and based on probable cause.
Although the President's directive does prohibit federal agencies from
testing employees for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal
investigation, a search incident to the drug testing directive is not outside
the scope of the fourth amendment simply because the search is noncriminal
innature.61 The purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect an individual
against governmental intrusion 2 The scope of the fourth amendment's

fire fighters is unconstitutional in absence of reasonable suspicion); Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517-18 (D.N.J. 1986)(permitting testing of municipal fire fighters on
506 N.Y.S.2d
reasonable suspicion of drug use); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, -,
789, 796-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986)(permitting testing of municipal police officers on reasonable
suspicion of drug use).
56. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order authorizing
drug testing for federal employees who occupy sensitive positions in federal government).
57. A Question of Privacy, NEwsWEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18.
58. See id.at 21. The attorney for the Boston Police Department, which instituted
mandatory drug testing for all City police officers, maintains that the fourth amendment does
not apply to the efforts of a government employer to discipline government employees who
engage in illicit behavior. Id. The attorney, therefore, believes that the Boston Police Department's testing scheme is outside the purview of fourth amendment protection. Id.
59. Id.
60. See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order's purpose to
identify and rehabilitate drug users in federal government).
61. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. 1122, 1127-28 (S.D. Iowa 1985)(fourth
amendment is fully applicable to drug testing program even if purpose of drug testing
program is not to gather evidence of criminal conduct), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987);
see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)(individual enjoys full protection
of fourth amendment even when suspected of only noncriminal behavior).
62. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
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protection, therefore, does not shift because an individual is not the subject
of a criminal investigation. 63 The fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, therefore, is applicable to the drug
testing directive, regardless of the purpose for which the government initiates

the search.
Other advocates of mandatory drug testing for public employees have
argued that, even if drug testing constitutes a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, the government, as an employer, should have the

same ability to investigate employee misconduct as employers in the private
sector

4

In support of this argument, proponents have argued that private

employers may require employees to submit to drug testing as a condition

of employment. 65 Moreover, a private employer can test employees even if
the employer has no reason to believe that employees are under the influence
of narcotics. 66 In effect, proponents of drug testing argue that, upon
assuming government employment, public employees implicitly waive protection of the fourth amendment. 6 7

63. See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985)(person and
property are fully protected by fourth amendment regardless of whether individual is subject
of criminal investigation), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
64. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736-37
(S.D. Ga. 1986). In American Federation of Government Employees v. Weinberger, the
defendant, the Department of Defense, implemented a drug testing plan for civilian employees
of the Department. Id. at 728. The plaintiff union, representing civilian security officers at
Fort Stewart Army Base in Georgia, challenged the testing plan as an unreasonable search
and seizure and violative of the fourth amendment. Id. at 730-31.
65. Id. at 736-37. In support of the plan to test civilian employees at Fort Stewart Army
Base, the Department of Defense in American Federation of Government Employees argued
that the fourth amendment unduly burdened the government's ability to regulate employee
conduct and to discover misconduct relevant to worker performance. Id.
The Department of Defense contended that the purpose of the search was not to gather
evidence for a criminal prosecution, but to determine whether the security officers were fit to
perform their public duty. Id. The Department of Defense, therefore, argued that government
employers should have the same ability to test for drug use as an employer in the private
sector. Id.
According to some researchers, drug use in the private sector has become a blight to
employers in the private sector. Battling the Enemy Within, TwmE, March 17, 1986, at 52, 53.
According to the Research Triangle Institute, a prominent research organization, drug abuse
among employees in the private sector resulted in a $60 billion cost to the United States
economy in 1983, representing a 30076 increase from 1980. Id. Drug abusers are three times
more likely to sustain work-related injuries than are nonusers. Id. Private employees who use
drugs are more likely to pilfer from a company's assets to support a drug habit. Id.
To curb the deleterious effects of drug use in the private sector, private employers have
instituted drug testing programs to identify employees who are drug users. Id. About onefourth of the Fortune 500 companies already screen applicants for drugs. Id.
66. See Note, supra note 26, at 272 n.23. In a survey of Fortune 500 companies, 13%
of the companies indicated that they conducted random drug tests of employees to discover
drug use. Id. Despite expert opinions that the practice of randomly testing employees is
ineffective in large portions of the United States work force, the practice of screening workers
for drug use increases daily. Id. at 270 n.12.
67. See, e.g., Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, -,
506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (N.Y.
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Although proponents' assert that public employees relinquish fourth
amendment protection when they assume public employment, case precedent
has established firmly, that, while the government may regulate public
employment, the government may not require a job applicant to waive
constitutionally protected rights as a precondition of employment. 68 Furthermore, the government may not require public employees to consent to
an unconstitutional search as a condition of continued employment. 69 The
proponents of the drug testing directive, therefore, must establish that the
drug testing plan is constitutionally reasonable before the government can
require a public employee to undergo urinalysis drug testing. 70
Despite vehement opposition to the President's directive authorizing drug
testing for federal employees, other proponents of mandatory drug testing
have advocated that the government expand the scope of the drug testing
plan to include drug testing for private employees who are engaged in
7
government-regulated industries, primarily in the transportation industry. '
These proponents have argued that testing of certain classes of private
employees, such as commercial airplane pilots or train operators, is not
unreasonable, despite the lack of individualized suspicion to believe that a
particular employee is under the influence of drugs. 72 Private employees
engaged in public transportation assume direct responsibility for the safety
Sup. Ct. 1986). In Caruso v. Ward, the plaintiff, as president of the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association of New York City, sought an order enjoining the New York City Police Department
(Department) from implementing a random drug testing program for current and future
members of the Department's Organized Crime Bureau (OCB). Id. at 791. The Department
argued that the Department could require OCB employees to consent to the testing as a
condition of their employment. Id. at 793.
68. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-06 (1977)(statute conditioning
office in political party on waiver of fifth amendment privilege is unconstitutional); Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973)(statute conditioning access to public benefits on waiver of
fifth amendment privilege is unconstitutional); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598
(1972)(state may not condition employment upon waiver of first amendment right of free
speech); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926)(government
may not condition access to public benefits on relinquishment of constitutional rights);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736 (S.D. Ga.
1986)(government may not condition public employment on waiver of fourth amendment right).
69. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736
(S.D. Ga. 1986)(government may not condition public employees' continued employment upon
relinquishment of fourth amendment right); Armstrong v. Commissioner of Correction, 545
F. Supp. 728, 731 (N.D.N.Y. 1982)(consent to unlawful body searches as condition of correction
facility officers' continued employment is unconstitutional).
70. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, No. 86-3833 (5th Cir. Apr.
22, 1987)(WESTLAW, Allfeds database)(efforts to reduce incidence of drug use among federal
employees must conform to constitutional standards).
71. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing proponents' reasoning for
implementing mandatory drug testing for private employees in federally-regulated industries).
72. See Random Drug Tests Ensure Public Safety, USA Today, Feb. 3, 1987, at 8A,
col. I (advocating random urinalysis for employees of government-regulated transportation
industries); Danforth, We Must Put Public Safety First, USA Today, February 3, 1987, at
8A, col. 2 (citing need for government-sponsored drug testing for pilots, air traffic controllers
and transportation employees).
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of passengers and the care of public and private property.73 Drug use among
public transportation employees would impair the government's interest in
providing for the safety of passengers. Random urinalysis, proponents argue,
is the only effective means of identifying those individuals who use drugs
74
and who, therefore, are more likely to cause serious harm to the public.
An overriding interest in public safety, these proponents conclude, justifies
testing private employees who serve in public transportation capacities
without cause to believe that an employee is under the influence of nar75
cotics.
Representatives of transportation employees opposed to the proposal to
test private employees in federally-regulated industries contend that government-sponsored drug testing without cause represents an unreasonable intrusion on the employees' right to privacy. 76 According to one representative,
77
the public has a legitimate expectation to a safe transportation system.
Drug use among transportation employees admittedly jeopardizes the government's interest in safety. 78 Despite the potential threat to public safety,
however, the representative contends that mandatory drug testing will subject
79
thousands of innocent employees to a substantial invasion of privacy.
Mass drug testing of private employees without individualized suspicion, he
8
concludes, is repugnant to fourth amendment jurisprudence. 0
Despite the contention that testing transportation employees for drugs
is unconstitutional in the absence of individualized suspicion of drug use,
a search can be constitutional without individualized suspicion if requiring
individualized suspicion before executing a search would frustrate a compelling government interest in public safety.8' Courts have created exceptions

73. Random Drug Tests Ensure Public Safety, supra note 72, at 8A, col. 1.
74. See Random Drug Tests Ensure Public Safety, supra note 72, at 8A, col. 1 (random
drug testing of transponation employees is essential to protecting safety of travelling public);
see also Danforth, supra note 72, at 8A, col. 2 (same).
75. Danforth, supra note 72, at 8A, col. 2.
76. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing drug testing opponents'
objections to mandatory drug testing for transportation employees).
77. See Mann, Random Drug Tests Violate Workers' Rights, USA Today, February 3,
1987, at 8A, col. 5 (statement by Lawrence Mann, attorney who represents railway labor
unions); see also Chapman, Drug Testing Is Easy, Quick-and Wrong, USA Today, February
3, 1987, at 8A, col. 5 (drug testing of transportation employee violates employee's right to
privacy); Alcohol and Drug Abuse Seen as Key Issue in Railroad Safety, N.Y. Times, Jan.
19, 1987, at A10, col. 2 (discussing transportation labor unions' opposition to drug testing for
transportation employees).
78. Mann, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5.
79. Id.; see also Chapman, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5 (inaccuracy of drug test results
subjects innocent transportation employees to risk of wrongful termination of employment).
80. Mann, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5.
81. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1978)(upholding requirement
that all persons entering San Francisco courthouse submit to check of persons and baggage
for explosives); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973)(permitting
government official to search all boarding passengers of airlines on unsupported suspicion to
thwart potential hijackers).
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to the requirement of individualized suspicion, for example, by permitting
regulatory inspections of residential housing, 2 and security screenings of
individuals entering courthouses, 3 or boarding commercial aircraft.84 In
each case, the purpose of the search is to ensure compliance with regulatory
requirements"5 or to discover and prevent future harm to the public, 86 but
not to gather evidence for use in criminal prosecution. Permitting the search
in the absence of individualized suspicion was the only effective, yet least
intrusive, means of enforcing compliance with the regulatory requirement
or precluding a demonstrated threat to the safety of persons or property.
87

82. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory scheme for entering
and inspecting residential housing without individualized suspicion of housing violations).
83. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1978). In McMorris v. Alioto,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of a security
procedure that required all persons entering a San Francisco courthouse to pass through a
metal detector. Id. A visitor to the building who activated the device could leave the building
without further search or investigation. Id. at 899. If a visitor who activated the device still
wanted to enter the building, he could empty his pockets of all metal items and pass through
the metal detector again. Id. If the visitor activated the metal detector the second time, the
visitor could enter the building only if he submitted to a frisk search. Id. Security officers
could conduct the frisk, however, only if the visitor gave explicit consent. Id.
Security officers also inspected briefcases and parcels that visitors carried into the
courthouse. Id.
84. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). In United States
v. Skipwith, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a warrantless
search conducted at the boarding gate of an international airport was reasonable even if the
federal agents merely suspected that a passenger was a hijacker. Id.
85. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525-26 (1967)(search to enforce
minimum housing standards promulgated through city ordinance).
86. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). In United States v.
Skipwith, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that an increased
incidence of plane hijackings, and the substantial threat to public safety that hijackings created,
justified an airport security procedure requiring all persons who enter boarding terminals to
submit to a search of their person and baggage before boarding the aircraft. Id. at 1276.
In defining the permissible scope of an airport pre-boarding search, the court in Skipwith
determined that federal marshals conducting the search could require individuals to empty
their pockets as well as to undergo a frisk of their persons. Id. at 1277. The court in Skipwith
acknowledged that the search was highly intrusive. Id. at 1275. Moreover, the court noted
that a search of one's bag or person can yield incriminating evidence. Id. A hijackers' ability
to conceal explosives or weapons in seemingly innocuous articles such as toothpaste tubes or
fountain pens justified the thoroughness of the search. Id.
In McMorris v. Alioto, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted
that threats of violence directed at courthouses, as well as bombings of other government
buildings, justified screening all persons entering a San Francisco courthouse for explosives or
weapons. McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1978).
87. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967). In Camara v.
Municipal Court, the United States Supreme Court, in concluding that a regulatory search of
a residence was reasonable even though the inspector did not have individualized suspicion of
housing violations, reasoned that housing inspectors would not be able to establish individualized suspicion of housing violations, such as faulty wiring, simply by inspecting the outside
premises of each house. Id. On the contrary, housing inspectors discover violations only after
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Recent drug-related tragedies in the railroad industry support the creation
of an administrative search exception permitting regular drug testing of
private railroad employees who are directly responsible for public safety.
Drug use among transportation employees already has jeopardized a legitimate interest in public safety.88 Government officials speculate that recent
accidents in public transportation, resulting in loss of life and substantial
damage to private property, were the result of drug-induced impairment of
railroad employees.89 A proposal to implement regular testing of employees
whose jobs are safety-related, therefore, would protect a legitimate govern-

mental interest by identifying individuals who are likely to jeopardize public
safety.
Although a compelling interest in public safety justifies an exception to
the requirement of individualized suspicion to test transportation employees,

an administrative search is unreasonable unless procedural safeguards adequately ensure that a search is not conducted in an oppressive or discriminatory mannerP ° An exception to the requirement of individuated suspicion

entering the building and conducting an inspection. Id. Requiring city inspectors to demonstrate
probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling violated a city housing ordinance, therefore,
was unduly burdensome and frustrated the city's interest in enforcing compliance with housing
standards. Id.
Despite the substantial intrusion to boarding passengers that a pre-boarding screening
entailed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Skipwith
concluded that federal agents could subject all boarding passengers to a search in the absence
of individualized suspicion that the individual was a hijacker. United States v. Skipwith, 482
F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). The court determined that the hijacker profile was an
unreliable means of identifying hijackers because not all hijackers were readily identifiable or
matched the profile's characteristics. Id. at 1276. The court concluded, therefore, that uniform
screening of all passengers, regardless of whether they appeared suspicious, was the only
reliable and effective means of averting the threat of hijacking. Id.
88. See Alcohol and Drug Abuse Seen as a Key Issue in Railroad Safety, supra note
77, at AIO col. 2. According to the United States Department of Transportation, drug or
alcohol abuse among railroad employees caused 48 train wrecks between 1975 to 1985. Id. In
those incidents, 37 people were killed and 80 people were injured. Id.
Drug use among railroad employees has become a concern of legislators. See id. United
States Congressman James Florio (D-N.J.), who has introduced several major pieces of rail
legislation in Congress, has indicated that drug use in the railroad industry has become a
"serious problem." Id.; see also Danforth, supra note 72, at 8A, col. 2 (statement by U.S.
Senator Jack Danforth, (R-Mo.), advocating regular drug testing for railroad employees).
89. See Alcohol and Drug Abuse Seen as Key Issue in Railroad Safety, supra note 77,
at A10, col. 2. Three major railway accidents within the last three years are believed to have
been drug-related. Id. Traces of cocaine and marijuana were found in a urine specimen of a
railroad signal operator who was on duty when two Amtrak trains collided in New York City
in July 1984. Id. In that accident, one person was killed and 125 passengers were injured. Id.
Officials investigating the cause of a train collision in Wyoming in 1984 reported that 6
of the 12 train crew members tested positive for drugs. Id.
Three of six train crew members involved in a commuter train wreck in December 1986
tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. Id., at col. 6. Thirty-seven people were injured in
the accident. Id.
90. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). In Camara v. Municipal
Court, the United States Supreme Court, in assessing the reasonableness of a regulatory scheme
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creates the potential that officials conducting a search will exercise unbridled
discretion in executing a search. 91 As one commentator explains, an official
authorized to test employees for drugs, for example, selectively could
administer the test to harass members of a certain political or ethnic group.2
To minimize the possibility of abuse, procedural devices must check the
discretion of the executing officer so that the officer impartially administers
the tests only to protect against the perceived threat to public safety. 93

for entering and inspecting private dwellings, indicated that the search was reasonable only if
procedural safeguards protected the occupants of the premises from random and arbitrary
invasions of privacy. Id. at 532-34. The Court in Camara concluded that regulatory searches
of private dwellings were reasonable because promulgated standards described the classes of
dwellings that were subject to routine inspection. Id. at 538. Moreover, inspectors, before
executing the search, had to obtain a warrant from an independent magistrate who verified
that the particular premises to be searched were subject to the housing code's regulations. Id.
91. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979). In Delaware v. Prouse, the
United States Supreme Court held that a police officer's stopping an automobile driver to
check the driver's identification was violative of the fourth amendment unless the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe that the operator was violating the law. Id. at 663.
In Prouse, a police officer had stopped the driver at random to check the driver's license
and vehicle registration. Id. at 650. The officer seized marijuana in plain view on the floor
of petitioner's automobile. Id. The arresting officer testified at a hearing to suppress the
marijuana that, before stopping the car, the officer had not observed the driver committing
an infraction. Id. The trial court suppressed the seized marijuana because the police officer
had stopped the driver without cause to believe the driver had violated the law. Id- at 651.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that randomly
stopping automobile operators to check identification furthered a legitimate government interest
in public safety. Id. at 658. Random checks identified automobile operators who were unlicensed
and cars that were not in compliance with minimum safety requirements. Id. The state's
interest in preventing harm to the public, the petitioner concluded, outweighed the intrusion
to the individual that the stop entailed. Id. at 659.
In rejecting the petitioner's argument, the United States Supreme Court determined that
the means by which the state sought to promote the safety interest were unreasonable. Id. at
659-61. The Court indicated that the petitioner had not offered empirical data demonstrating
that the practice of randomly checking motor operators was an effective method of identifying
unlicensed operators or unregistered vehicles. Id. Moreover, the state had not established
standards to check the officers' discretion in selecting drivers for document inspection. Id. at
661. Permitting police officers to stop and inspect a motorist randomly would subject the
motorist on the open highway to the risk of an overintrusive or abusive search.
The Court in Prouse did not preclude the state from developing procedures for spot
checks of automobiles that did protect motorists from the risk of abusive searches. Id. at 663.
As an example, the Court indicated that procedures establishing a fixed checkpoint at which
all on-coming automobiles were stopped for document inspection would be reasonable. Id. at
663.
92. Banzhaf, How to Make Drug Tests Pass Muster, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 13,
24, col. 1.
93. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973). The United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Skipwith indicated that
circumstances minimizing the potential for abusive searches were a significant factor contributing to the reasonableness of an airport security procedure in which all boarding passengers
of commercial aircraft were subject to a search of their person and baggage. Id. The court in
Skipwith noted that the search was supervised, and that the search occurred within view of
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To curb arbitrary application of drug testing of transportation employees,
the government must promulgate standards that strictly regulate the manner
in which officials conduct drug testing. 94 An employee, for example, would
need to know which officials can request an employee to submit to drug
testing and the frequency with which employers can test employees. Moreover, officials must use neutral, not discriminatory, criteria in selecting
employees for drug testing. 95 By fully informing employees about drug
testing procedures, employees would be able to resist attempts to administer
drug tests to harass or oppress employees.
Opponents of drug testing for railroad employees concede that, while
testing of railroad employees without probable cause would serve a vital
public interest in safety, a plan authorizing testing of all employees without
probable cause is unreasonable because less sweeping means of identifying
drug-impaired employees are equally effective.16 Individuals in public safety
capacities are under the close supervision of superiors and coworkers. 97 A
public safety employee under the influence of narcotics would manifest
behavior that would amount to reasonable suspicion that he was intoxicated.98 Opponents of mandatory drug testing for railroad employees, therefore, conclude that testing only upon reasonable suspicion does not burden
unduly the government's efforts to identify individuals who are likely to
jeopardize public safety. 99
While most courts agree that requiring reasonable suspicion to test public
employees for drugs does not hamper the government's ability to protect
public safety, a recent study indicates that requiring reasonable suspicion
before conducting a drug test would hamper the government's ability to
the public and under the scrutiny of airline representatives, who had a substantial interest in
ensuring that federal agents did not harass boarding passengers. Id. The court concluded that,
in this situation, the agents were more likely to respect the fourth amendment rights of the
passengers than if the search occurred in a remote area of the airport and out of public view.
Id; see McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1978)(administrative search of persons
entering courthouse must be limited and no more invasive than necessary to protect against
the danger sought to be avoided).
94. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)(in situations in which search
occurs absent individualized suspicion, other safeguards must ensure that individual's privacy
is not subject to whim of officer conducting search).
95. See id. at 662 (regulatory search unsupported by individualized suspicion must be
executed pursuant to neutral criteria); Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275 (intrusiveness of airport
security screening is minimized if persons are selected for search on basis of neutral criteria).
96. Mann, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5; see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text
(discussing rationale for assertion that testing employees only upon reasonable suspicion does
not burden government's ability to protect interest in public safety).
97. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986)(police officers
and fire fighters are under constant observation of superiors).
98. See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 883 (E.D. Tenn. 1987)(fire
fighters who use drugs would incur financial difficulties or have high incidence of absenteeism,
creating reasonable suspicion of drug use); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1518 (D.N.J. 1986)(drug use among fire fighters would become apparent through adverse
effects on fire fighters' performance).
99. Mann, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5.
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provide for public safety. In a study conducted by the Stanford University

School of Medicine, researchers studied the effects of marijuana on airplane
pilots' ability to perform routine flight and landing operations using flight
simulators.10 Twenty-four hours after the pilots smoked marijuana, the
pilots' performance was impaired, yet the pilots' disability was apparent
only after they had attempted to maneuver the planes.10' Although the test

results are inconclusive, the researchers believe that the use of marijuana
may impair a individual's ability to perform complex mechanical tasks such
as operating heavy equipment or railway switching procedures for at least
twenty-four hours after smoking. 0 2 Insisting upon demonstrable signs of
intoxication before the government may test for drugs, therefore, could
undermine the government's ability to detect drug-impaired individuals who
perform safety-related functions before they cause harm to the public.

Although proponents of testing insist that mandatory urinalysis testing
is the only reliable and effective means of identifying individuals who are
under the influence of drugs, critics contend that drug testing for employees

exposes innocent persons to the risk of false accusations of drug use. 03 The
most common method used to test employees for drugs is the enzyme
multiplied immunoassay technique (EMIT) test, which detects the presence
°4 The EMIT test,
of marijuana in the test subject's urine.M
however, is a

100. See Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister, Carry-Over Effects of MarijuanaIntoxication on Aircraft Pilot Performance:A PreliminaryReport, 142 Am. J. PsYCHIATRY 1325,
1325 (1985) In a test conducted by researchers at Stanford University Medical Center to
measure the effects of marijuana on pilots' performance 24 hours after smoking marijuana,
each of 10 licensed private pilots, all experienced users of marijuana, were given the equivalent
of a strong social dose of marijuana at 9:00 a.m. on the day before the researchers began the
flight testing. Id. at 1326. At 8:00 a.m. the next day, the pilots were required to perform a
standard maneuver entailing a simple landing procedure. Id. The maneuver required the pilots
to take off, climb to 700 feet, make two turns and execute a landing. Id. at 1326. The
experiment was conducted in a computerized laboratory designed specifically for conducting
research of pilot performance. Id. at 1325.
101. Id. at 1328. The pilots participating in the test conducted by researchers at Stanford
University School of Medicine experienced significant impairment in aligning and landing the
plane on the flight simulator runway. Id. Although only one pilot failed to land the plane,
the researchers emphasize that under actual flight conditions, the pilots' impairment would
cause the pilots to crash more frequently. Id.
Despite the changes in the pilots' performance, the pilots reported no subjective awareness
of impairment, mood change or alertness 24 hours after smoking the sample of marijuana.
Id.
102. Id. at 1328.
103. See Chapman, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5 (drug tests are unreliable indicators of
drug use and drug testing for employees in public transportation exposes employees to false
accusation of drug use); Mann, supra note 77, at 8A, col. 5 (drug testing of railroad employees
is ineffective means of identifying drug users).
104. See Note, supra note 26, at 273. Employers favor the enzyme multiplied immunoassay
technique (EMIT) test primarily because the EMIT test does not require a technical interpretation of test results, and an employer or supervisor can administer the test. Id. at 273 n.29.
Employers also favor the use of the EMIT test because the test is relatively inexpensive, costing
an employer less than five dollars to administer the test. Id. at 273. In addition to identifying
the presence of marijuana, the EMIT test also detects the presence of cocaine, barbiturates,
amphetamines, and several other substances. Id.
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relatively unsophisticated test, and commentators have criticized the EMIT
test as an inaccurate and unreliable indicator of drug use. 10 5 The EMIT
test's inability to detect drug use accurately, therefore, is a significant factor
that militates against an administrative search exception for testing public
6
employees, because the tests would not serve a rational purpose."
Although the EMIT test is an unreliable indicator of drug use, precautionary measures can substantially minimize the risks associated with EMIT
test's use. A more sophisticated testing apparatus, for example, can verify
07
the accuracy of an EMIT test result with one hundred percent accuracy.
Confirming the results of an EMIT test substantially reduces the risk of an
employee wrongfully facing the adverse consequences of a positive test
result. When used in conjunction with confirmatory test procedures, the
EMIT test can be a reliable method of detecting drug use. 08
Determining the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing programs
without individualized suspicion for public employees and private employees
in public service capacities involves a balancing of the government's interest
in testing for drugs against the individual's interest in privacy.' 9 In balancing
the interests, courts should consider the significance of the particular interest
the government seeks to promote through testing, the justification or need
for initiating a drug testing program, and the degree of personal invasion

105. See Note, Is Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rav.,
1451, 1456-60 (1986)(discussing various flaws in EMIT test's reliability as drug detector). The
EMIT test can register a positive test result even though the subject has not used illicit drugs.
Id. at 1458. Individuals who have taken nonprescription cough or cold medicines, for example,
can yield a positive test result Note, supra note 26, at 274. Moreover, an individual who has
an unintentional exposure to marijuana, due to passive inhalation, for example, also risks a
positive result for marijuana. Id. at 274 and n.40. Finally, the EMIT test also cannot distinguish
accurately between THC, the marijuana trace element, and a body substance in dark-skinned
persons that resembles the marijuana element, thus exposing blacks and hispanics to greater
risk of falsely testing positive for marijuana. Note, supra, at 1459.
Other studies reveal the EMIT test's failure to detect the presence of narcotics in
individual's who had used drugs, thus undermining further the EMIT test's credibility. See
Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing, 253 J.A.M.A. 2382 (1985). The Centers for
Disease Control monitored the 13 laboratories that process EMIT tests. Id. The Center for
Disease Control reported the following rates of error in detecting commonly abused drugs:
0% to 100% for cocaine, 11% to 94% for barbiturates, and 19% to 100% for amphetamines.
Id.
106. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1978)(to be constitutional,
administrative search of persons entering courthouse must be reasonably effective in discovering
object of search).
107. See Note, supra note 26, at 273. Gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC/MS)
is most commonly used to verify the results of the EMIT test. Id. Private employers have
hesitated to verify EMIT tests with GC/MS only because GC/MS costs between $50-$100 to
perform. Id.
108. See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Storms v.
Coughlin, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York emphasized
the need for confirmation of all positive EMIT test results. Id. The court enjoined the use of
positve EMIT test results in prison disciplinary hearings unless the tests were confirmed by an
alternate means of analysis. Id.
109. Supra note 28 and accompanying text-
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that the program entails. 110 Every search must be justified at its inception,
however, and unless the government establishes a nexus between drug use
and an impairment of a government interest, a drug testing program would
be an unnecessary invasion of personal privacy and, therefore, unconstitutional."'
Although drug testing without individualized suspicion in most circumstances would violate a fundamental principal of fourth amendment jurisprudence, drug testing without individualized suspicion can be reasonable
2
if the testing promotes a legitimate need in preserving public safety." Under
those circumstances in which the balance between the government's interest
and the individual's fourth amendment interest in privacy precludes insistence upon some showing of individualized suspicion, however, courts have
demanded that procedural safeguards ensure that the individual's rights are
3
not subject to arbitrary or indiscriminate government intrusion." Standards
that establish nondiscriminatory guidelines for testing employees, for example, are an essential element of a constitutional testing program. Established guidelines ensure that a testing program, while promoting a legitimate
safety interest, does not infringe unduly upon an employee's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
KEviN

C. MILNE

110. Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
11. Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1506, 1516-17 (D.N.J. 1986).
112. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (threats of violence against government
buildings warranted mandatory search of all persons entering courthouse); supra note 84 and
accompanying text (explaining that threat of harm associated with hijackings justifies exception
to requirement of individualized suspicion to search all passengers boarding commercial

aircraft).
113. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979)(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).

